I. Introduction
new cars. Studies that ignore these adjustments could understate a gas tax's impacts on fuel consumption.
Another set of differences from earlier work is in the econometric approach. By allowing the structural parameters entering preferences to vary randomly across households, we can account for rich patterns of unobserved preference heterogeneity. And in contrast with nearly all prior work, we adopt an estimation approach that simultaneously estimates in a utility-consistent manner each household's automobile choice and its choice of VMT. 3 This is important for evaluating welfare impacts. 4 An appendix to this paper, available at www.stanford.edu/~goulder/gastaxpaper, details the simulation model's structure, data, estimation approach, and solution method.
We examine policy impacts both in the aggregate as well as across households distinguished by income, car ownership, and other characteristics. Simulation results show that whether a gas tax increase is regressive in its impact depends on the manner in which the tax revenues are recycled (returned) to the economy. The results also reveal significant heterogeneity in welfare impacts within household income groups, thus highlighting the importance of accounting for household heterogeneity in tastes and car-ownership in evaluating distributional impacts.
II. Structure of the Simulation Model

A. Household Demands
Households obtain utility from car ownership and use, as well as from consumption of other commodities. Utility from driving depends on characteristics of the automobile and vehicle- 3 The one exception is a recent working paper by Feng, Fullerton, and Gan (2004) . 4 Prior studies have tended to focus on policies' impacts on prices or quantities, rather than the welfare consequences. miles traveled. Each household has exogenous income; most households also are endowed with cars. If a household has a car endowment, it chooses whether to hold or relinquish (sell or scrap) that car; if it relinquishes the car it also decides whether to purchase a different car (new or used).
Households without car endowments simply choose whether to purchase a car.
U.S. auto markets include thousands of types of new and used cars and trucks, and many households own several vehicles. Households enjoy a huge number of possible household car choices, far more than would be tractable econometrically or in a simulation model. To achieve manageable dimensionality, we group cars and trucks into 284 categories based on the vehicle's age, class, and manufacturer. In addition, to deal with multiple-car households, we adopt a variation of the repeated discrete-continuous modeling approach of Hendel (1999) and Dube (2004) . 5 Here we assume that household automobile choices arise from decisions made on T separable choice occasions where T depends on the number of adults in the household. On each occasion, the household makes a discrete choice of whether to choose one of the 284 composite cars. If the j th automobile is chosen, the household then makes a continuous choice of VMT for the automobile. A virtue of this approach is that it significantly limits the dimensionality of the choice problem. The disadvantage is that it implicitly assumes that the household's automobile decisions with respect to different cars in its fleet are separable from each other.
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More specifically, we assume that household preferences on the t th choice occasion (t=1,…,T) for the j th automobile (j=1,…,J) can be represented by the conditional indirect utility 5 Most previous studies have avoided the difficulties arising with multiple car households by considering single car purchases in the new car market (e.g., Goldberg (1995) , Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) or by focusing on the roughly 85 percent of households with two or fewer cars (West (2004) 
The rational household chooses the alternative that maximizes its utility. Assuming that each is an independent draw from the type I extreme value distribution with common scale parameter tj ε µ , the probability that the household chooses the j th automobile conditional on β takes the standard conditional logit form. Because we employ a theoretically consistent preference specification, we can use Roy's identity to derive the conditional VMT demand for the chosen automobile.
B. Supply of New and Used Cars
The model distinguishes five age categories, ten car classes, and seven manufacturer (make) categories. 7 This yields 350 possible age-class-manufacturer combinations, but since some combinations are not realized the model actually includes 284 cars.
Each of the seven producers acts in accordance with Bertrand competition, setting the prices for its fleet of automobiles to maximize profits, given the prices set by its competitors. New cars differ by class and manufacturer. Let k index a given producer. Let Φ represent the set of 7 The age categories are less than 1 (new), 1-2, 3-6, 7-11, and 12-19 years old. The car classes are compact, luxury compact, midsize, fullsize, luxury midsize/fullsize, small SUV, large SUV, small truck, large truck, and minivan. Above, e and refer to the fuel-economy (miles per gallon) requirements for light trucks and passenger cars, respectively, and e j refers to the fuel-economy of car j . Thus, the two constraints express the requirement that the given manufacturer achieve fleet-wide average fueleconomy above T e and C e , respectively, for the light trucks and cars it produces. To obtain the equilibrium, all car prices (and associated markups) must be solved for simultaneously.
The stock of used cars is equal to an exogenously specified maximal amount, less the number of scrapped cars. The amount of scrappage is endogenous. For each car type, there is a probability distribution for maintenance costs. If a household owns a car requiring exceptionally high maintenance, it will prefer to scrap the car rather than pay the costs of keeping the car in operation.
Each car type, or age-class-manufacturer combination, has its own market price. The model determines the set of prices for all car types that is consistent with each new-car producer's profit-maximization (first-order) conditions and that clears the used-car market. Since the demand for every car depends on the prices of all other cars (new and used), all car prices need to be solved for simultaneously.
III. Data and Econometric Estimation
We estimated the parameters entering household preferences for automobile demand with horsepower, wheelbase, and fuel-economy) and operating costs.
In designing an estimation approach, two issues were especially important. First, for consistent welfare assessments we wanted to estimate simultaneously and consistently the household's choice of VMT and car type. The two-step estimation strategies in previous studies (e.g., Goldberg (1998) , West (2004) ) did fully integrate these decisions. Second, we were concerned about unobserved preference heterogeneity, which has the potential to bias our parameter estimates and yield implausible predictions about substitution patterns.
To address these concerns, we developed a random-coefficient repeated discretecontinuous model permitting simultaneous estimation of households' car and VMT choices.
Random-coefficient specifications can generate more plausible structures of substitution relative to fixed parameter models (Train, 2003) , and recently developed simulation-based techniques now make the estimation of these models computationally feasible. We estimate our random-coefficient model within a Bayesian framework, using a variation of Allenby and Lenk's (1994) Gibbs Sampling algorithm.
The posterior means of our parameter estimates were generally consistent with our a priori expectations and suggested posterior mean VMT operating cost and income elasticities on the order of -0.70 and 0.64, respectively. We also found mean automobile holding elasticities with respect to the own rental price of roughly -0.75 for all cars and trucks and -1.78 for new cars and trucks.
IV. Results
We simulate the impact of raising the federal gasoline tax by 10, 30, or 50 cents per gallon.
The benchmark gross-of-tax price of gasoline (which varies by state) averages around $1.45, 9 so the gas tax increments imply relative price increases between 6 and 35 percent. We explore two types of revenue-recycling: "tax-based recycling," in which revenues are recycled to households in proportion to their gasoline tax payments, and "income-based recycling," where revenues are recycled in proportion to their benchmark income. Table 2 displays the distributional impacts of a 30-cent gas tax increase for households grouped by income, family size (measured by the number of children) and stage of life (retired or not). The welfare impact (EV) of the policy is reported as a percentage of benchmark income.
A. Gross Efficiency Costs and Changes in Gasoline Consumption
B. Distributional Impacts
Under tax-based recycling, the gasoline tax increase is close to proportional in its impact. 10 The cost of policy for households with annual income less than $25,000 is about 0.10% of their income, while for households with income greater than $75,000 it is about 0.09%. The cost of the policy 10 It would be exactly proportional in the absence of relative price changes. Such changes differentially affect the values of household endowments and the commodities (cars) they prefer to purchase, thus causing slight departures from proportionality.
relative to income is highest for households not retired and with children. These households tend to drive more than others.
The results under income-based recycling are very different. Here the impacts are highly regressive. Under income-based recycling, relatively low (high) income households enjoy much lower (higher) transfers than they do under tax-based recycling. Households earning over $75,000 a year enjoy a welfare gain from the policy change.
Income-based recycling is relatively beneficial to households that do little driving, since these households nevertheless can enjoy significant recycled gas-tax revenues. Thus the retired suffer welfare losses under tax-based recycling, but enjoy welfare gains under income-based recycling. Similarly, while all car owners experience welfare losses under tax-based recycling, only the high-probability car owners 11 lose under income-based recycling. The presence or absence of car-ownership is especially significant for the poorest households. Indeed, these results suggest that there is considerable heterogeneity in the impacts of a gas tax on the poorest households: among these households, the impacts depend importantly on the nature of recycling, whether the household is retired, and presence or absence of car-ownership.
V.
Future Work
This is our first application of the model. Several improvements and new applications are
planned. The present model only considers a policy's impacts in the year of its implementation.
We currently are expanding the model to enable it to examine long-run effects associated with the gradual evolution of the automobile fleet. We also are exploring alternative ways to deal with the potentially very high dimensionality that arises from the multitude of car types and car combinations. In subsequent applications we hope to perform a more comprehensive assessment of distributional impacts, considering other demographic dimensions such as race and region of residence. We would also like to consider other policies to reduce gasoline consumption, including changes to CAFE standards and subsidies to retirements of low-mileage vehicles. 
VI.
